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NOTES
CRIMINAL LAW-CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY-THE DEFENSE OF
INSANITY.-"Probably no branch of criminal law has been the sub-
ject of so much criticism and controversy as the defense of in-
sanity."'
The most repeated criticism is that the existing legal "tests" which
are used to determine whether a person is responsible for his mis-
deeds are not in accord with modern psychological and psychiatric
knowledge. 2 Our courts are continually urged to liberalize an ex-
isting test or to adopt a new one. The law has remained adamant
in its rejection of suggestions that it should expand or discard avail-
able tests. The rare instance in which a court responds to the plea
by extending an old test or adopting a new one is worthy of
comment.
In Durham v. United States,- the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia re-examined the conventional tests of in-
sanity and concluded that a broader test should be adopted, while
in State v. White4 the Supreme Court of New Mexico determined
that a limited extension of the test applied in that state was desir-
able. These decisions are significant, but to enable the reader to
view them in proper perspective a discusson of the historical de-
velopment of the defense of insanity is necessary.
The mental state of the defendant has not always been a factor
in determining his responsibility for a criminal act. In early English
law an individual was held strictly liable for his actions, irrespec-
tive of mental illness.' At some later date it became the practice
to bring a special verdict that the defendant was mad, whereupon
the king would grant him a pardon. By Edward III's reign (1326-
27), absolute "madness' had become a complete defense to a crim-
inal charge.( Once the law admitted insanity as a defense it be-
came necessary to define what mental condition would constitute
insanity in the legal sense. That the problem was not easily solved
is evidenced by the many tests that were developed, used and dis-
carded as unsatisfactory over the next five-hundred years. 7 The
1. Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense 1 (1954).
2. Id. at 2.
3. 214 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
4. 58 N.M. 324, 270 P.2d 727 (1954).
5. See 2 Holdsworth, History of English Law 50-54 (3d ed. 1923).
6. 3 Holdsworth, History of English Law 372 (3d ed. 1923).
7. Among those discarded were the "wild beast test", the "good and evil test", the
"fourteen year old test", and the "twenty pence test". They are discussed in Gluec,
Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law c.5 (1925).
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basis of present day tests was conceived in the 1843 trial of one
Daniel M'Naghten.
THE M'NAGHTEN RULE
Daniel M'Naghten shot and killed the private secretary of Sir
Robert Peel believing him to be Sir Robert. M'Naghten labored un-
der the insane delusion that he was being hounded by his enemies
and the prime minister was one of them. Medical evidence tended
to prove that the defendant was affected by morbid delusions which
carried him beyond the power of his own control, leaving him un-
able to distinguish right and wrong, and that he was incapable of
controlling his conduct in connection with the delusion. The jury
found him not guilty by reason of insanity.
Much popular interest was generated by the case, undoubtedly
due to the prestige of the deceased and the intended victim, and
the acquittal on the grounds of insanity. The House of Lords de-
cided to investigate the verdict and ". . . the question of unsound-
ness of mind which would excuse the commission of a felony of
this sort".9 The judges of England were summoned to the House of
Lords and were asked five hypothetical questions regarding the law
of insanity. Embodied in their answers to the second and third
question is the M'Naghten Rule or "right-wrong" test. The judges
felt ". . . that to establish a defense on the grounds of insanity, it
must be clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the
party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act
he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was do-
ing what was wrong".10 The test has met wide judicial acceptance
and it is the sole test of irresponsibility in England and in twenty-
nine American states.1' In six states,'12 including North Dakota, 13 the
8. Daniel M'Naughten's Case, 10 Clark & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
9. Id. at 202, 8 Eng. Rep. at 720.
10. Id. at 209, 8 Eng. Rep. at 722. The specific questions to which the above an-
swer was given were: Question 2, "What are the proper questions to be submitted to the
;ury, when a person alleged to be afflicted with an insane delusion respecting one or more
particular subjects or persons, is charged with the commission of a crime (murder, .for
example), and insanity is set up as a defense?" Question 3, "In what terms ought the
question to be left to the jury, as to the prisoner's state of mind at the time the act Was
committed?"
11. Weihofen, op. cit. supra note 2 at 51.
12. Weihofen, op. cit. supra note 2 at 51, n. 4. They are: Louisiana, Minnesota, New
York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota.
13. N.D. Rev. Code 112-0201(4) (1943) provides that among those incapable of
committing crime are "Lunatics, insane persons, and all persons of unsound mind, in-
cluding persons temporarily or partially deprived of reason, upon proof that at the time
of committing the act charged against them they were incapable of knowing its wrong-
fulness".
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right-wrong test has in substance been enacted into law by statute.
Notwithstanding its popularity with the courts, the test has been
vehemently criticized by legal writers, psychologists and psychi-
atrists."4 Much of the criticism is directed at the psychology on
which the rule is based. The psychological theory in vogue when
the rule was laid down was called "faculty psychology" and is now
outmoded. 15 Basically, proponents of the theory claimed that there
were only three aspects to all mental processes: the cognitive, i.e.
knowledge or the capacity for it; the conative, i.e. will or volition;
and the affective, i.e. emotion reflected by a feeling toward an ob-
ject. 6 They further maintained that the three facilities functioned
independently; 1 7 therefore, it was possible that mental disease could
strike one of the faculties while leaving the others unimpaired.
The right-wrong test is based solely on the cognitive aspect of
this psychology." The emphasis placed on the knowledge phase
of mental activity is not unique to the M'Naghten rule but may be
found in the law as early as the 13th century!" However, the idea
that the brain is divisible-into various compartments and that an
individual may be insane in some respects while remaining sane in
other respects has been discarded by the medical profession.2"
Another oft-voiced criticism is that the questions presented to the
judges in the M'Naghten Case were intended to cover only a single
psychosis of which a delusional manifestation is the most striking
symptom. 21 The law, however, has extended the test indiscrimi-
14. See Glueck, op. cit. supra note 7, at 166-186; 2 Stephen, History of the Criminal
Law of Englan4 154-160 (1883); Zilboorg, The Psychology of the Criminal Act and
Punishment 10 (1954)i Zilboorg states "'. . . the M'Naughten rule is substantially the
guiding principle of our criminal jurisprudence whenever psychiatric issues are -aised.
As such it stands immutable; it is the impenetrable wall behind which sits entrenched the
almost unconquerable prosecutor; it is the monster of the earnest psychiatrist which
prevents him from introducing into the courtroom true understanding of human psy-
chology and of the psychology of the criminal act."
15. The father of "faculty psychology" was Christian Wolff. His original classifica-
tion included only the intellect and the will, but his disciple, Tetons, added emotioS
to these thus completing the tripartite division. See Muller-Freienfels, The Evolution of
Modern Psychology 293 (1935).
16. See Hall, Principles of Criminal Law 492 n. 45 (1947) citing McDougall, Intro-
duction to Social Psychology 26-27 (4th ed. 1911).
17. Muller-Freienfels, op cit. supra note 15 at 293.
18. See Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 871-2 (D.C. Cir. 1954) citing Glueck,
FPychiatry and the Criminal Law, 12 Mental Hygiene 575, 580 (1928).
19. Knowledge' was one part of the "wild beast test". Thus a madman was one who
did not know what he was doing, and who was not far removed from the brutes. This
is pointed out by Glueck, op. cit. supra note 14 at 126-27.
20. See Davidson, Forensic Psychiatry 18 (1952); Perkins, Partial Insanity, 25 J. Crim.
L. & Criminology 175,176 (1934).
21. Dorland, The American Illpstrated Medical Dictionary (22d ed. 1951) defines psy-
chosis: "1. Formerly, a generic name for any mental disorder. Specifically, the deeper
and prolonged behavior disorders such as dementia praecox and manic-depressiees . . .".
"Manic-depressive psychoses are essentially benign, affective psychoses, chiefly marked by
emotional instability, striking mood swings, and a tendency to recurrence . . .".
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nately to cases involving types of mental disorders with respect to
which it's use is inappropriate. There are other criticisms of the rule
but these two are among the most important.
22
THE IRRESISTIBLE IMPULSE TEST
Fifteen states hold the right-wrong test inadequate as a criterion
of responsibility unless it is supplemented by an additional test. "3
The commission of a crime is excused in these states even if the
accused knew that what he was doing was wrong, provided that as
a result of mental disease he lacked the power to resist the im-
pulse to commit the act. This is commonly called the irresistible
impluse test and it is derived from the conative or will power aspect
of "faculty psychology".
The foregoing test is at least as old as the M'Naghten rule. In
fact, traces of it can be found in early common-law. "An involuntary
act," wrote Blackstone, "as it has no claim to merit, so neither can
it induce guilt: the concurrence of the will, when it has its choice
either to do or to avoid the fact in question, being the only thing
that renders human action either praiseworthy or culpable. Indeed,
to make a complete crime cognizable by human' laws, there must
be both a will and an act.
" 2
4
The irresistible impulse test found its first judicial expression in
an early Ohio case in which the judge told the jury that knowledge
of right and wrong and power to forbear or to do the act was the
test of responsibility.25 It has also been stated that under the rule
the defendant must have been a "free-agent" before he can be held
criminally responsible.21
Courts have rejected the irresistible impulse test for many reas-
ons. Some writers say that an irresistible impulse does not exist and
that the term actually means "unresisted" impulse, the failure to re-
sist resulting from habit or lack of self-restraint.7 Psychiatrist critics
22. See note 14 supra.
23. Weihofen, op. cit. supra note 11, at 51. Professor Weihofen states that fourteen or
more states have adopted irresistible impulse as a test, but since his book went to press New
Mexico has adopte-d the test also. See note 31 infra.
24. 4 BI. Comm.-21.
25. See State-v. Thompson, Wright's. Ohio Rep. 617, 662 (1834).
26. See Clark v. State, 12 Ohio Rep. 483, 494 n. a (1843). Discussing the wording
of a rtatute, Judge Birchard said: "Purposely implies an act of will; an intention; a
design to do the act. It presupposes the free agency of the actor." The free agency
wording was also used in Boyle v. State, 229 Ala. 212, 154 So. 575, 584, 586 (1934).
27. See Glueek, op. cit. supra note 19, at 235; Keedy, Irresistible Impulse As a De-
fense In The Criminal Law, 100 U.. of Pa. L. Rev. 956 at 987,988 (1952); Moreland,*
Law of Homicide 284 (1952).
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insist that this objection completely ignores scientific findings.2-
Difficulty and impracticality of proving or disproving the defense
is another reason advanced for rejecting the test. It is difficult to
accept this objection because the law is called upon to decide many
things that are incapable of precise determination, and yet the law
must perform the task. One writer has suggested that this is really
only a "lazy argument"." An objection that has much popular
appeal is that if the test is adopted it will result in an increase in
crime, presumably because adoption of the test would appear to
sanction the idea that criminal impulses need not be resisted. How-
ever., no statistics have been submitted to show that the administra-
tion of justice has broken down in those states where the defense
is allowed.30 In State v. White the New Mexico court adopted the
irresistible impulse test.8 1 The fact that this was the first time in
twenty-three years that a court has adopted the test is indicative
of its judicial unpopularity.
THE NEW HAMPSHIRE RULE AND THE RULE IN
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Because of the similarity of the rules in these jurisdictions they
will be discussed together. New Hampshire resolves the problem
by saying that there is no legal definition of insanity; that the
question of what constitutes insanity is one of fact to be decided by
the jury alone. This idea is based on a fundamental principle of
criminal law, viz; one is not responsible for his acts if he lacks "the
required criminal intent. In one New Hampshire case the jury was
instructed to decide whether the defendant had a mental disease
and if he had, to determine whether the disease was of such
character or was so far developed as to take away capacity to form
or entertain the criminal intent. Commenting on the instructions,
Justice Doe said, "Tried by the standard of legal precedent the in-
structions are wrong; tried by the standard of legal principle, they
are right.""2
28. Hacker and Frym, The Legal Concept of Insanity and the Treatment of Crimi-
nal Impulses, 37 Cal. L. Rev. 575, 583-4 (1949).
29. Ibid. See Goodhart, Essays in Jurisprudence and the Common Law 47 (1931).
30. See Glueck, op. cit. supra note 27, at 238; Hacker and Frym, supra note 28, at
585; and Weihofen, supra note 23, at 98.
31. See 58 N.M. 324, 270 P.2d 727, 730 (1954). The court approved the follow-
ing extension of the M'Naghten Rules, "Assuming defendant's knowledge that the act
was wrong, if, by reason of disease of the mind, defendant has been deprived of or lost
the power of his will which would enable him to prevent himself from doing the act,
then he cannot be found guilty."
32. State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 429 (1869). The instructions were reaffirmed one
year later in State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369, 399 (1871).
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The rule adopted in the Durham case is not unlike that followed
by the New Hampshire court. 3 The new test is simply that "an
accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the
product of mental disease or mental defect".3" There is one funda-
mental difference between the Durham rule and the New Hamp-
shire rule. The New Hampshire rule is based on the principle that to
impose guilt, it must be shown only that the accused had the mental
capacity to form the intent to commit the crime. There is no
mention of this principle in the Durham rule. Presumably, whether
the defendant entertained the intent or not, if his act was the
product of a mental disease or defect, he is not responsible under
this rule. It becomes important then to determine what the court
meant by "product" and "mental disease or defect". The word
"product" is used in the sense of a causal connection between the
act and the disease or defect. The court defined "disease" as "...
a condition which is considered capable of either improving or de-
teriorating." A "defect" is " . . a condition which is not considered
capable of either improving or deteriorating and which may be
either congenital, or the result of injury, or the residual effect of a
physical or mental disease." 5
The wording of the test and the definitions of its terms are so
broad that almost any mental disorder could qualify as a defense
under it. Language employed elsewhere in the opinion indicates
that the court intended that only major psychoses should qualify
as defenses. Many factors point to this conclusion. The defendant
had been diagnosed as suffering from psychosis with psychopathic
personality. The court quoted a section of the Royal Commission
Report which tells of the personality change that takes place in a
person suffering from melancholia, schizophrenia, and paranoid
psychoses,36 all examples of major psychoses. In addition, the court
found the irresistible impulse test inadequate because it gives no rec-
ognition to mental disease characterized by brooding and reflec-
tion,37 symptoms of some major psychoses.
Basing irresponsibility on the presence of a psychosis was advo-
cated by the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment.38 Sub-
33. See Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
34. Id. at 374-5.
35. Id. at 875.
36. Id. at 873-4
37. Id. at 874.
38. See Weihofen, op cit. supra note 30 at 116 citing the Royal Commission on
Capital Punishment Report 116, 275 (1949-1953).
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stantially the same position has been taken by other writers on the
subject. 9 The Durham rule will undoubtedly be more acceptable
to psychiatrists because it brings the law into accord with medicine
on the subject of mental illness and at long last gives legal recogni-
tion to the achievements of psychology and psychiatry.4 °
It was previously pointed out that the psychology underlying the
old tests is outmoded. Psychiatry today has advanced beyond the
point where the addition of the irresistable impulse test would be
considered adequate to remedy the deficiencies of the right-wrong
test.41 - Contemporary psychology views the individual as a com-
pletely integrated person. "The mind does not function, either in
health or disease, in parts, but as a whole." 42 Both the right-wrong
test and the irresistible impulse test fail to recognize this basic
psychological concept. Disorders of the mind that principally in-
volve the affective-emotional phase of mental activity are as im-
portant in criminal acts as are defects which mainly effect the
knowledge or conative phase; but, neither the right-wrong test nor
the irresistible impulse test when strictly applied will sanction ex-
cusing acts caused by disturbances of this type. Examples of those
suffering from such illnesses are the manic-depressives and the
schizophrenics. Persons afflicted with such disorders may coldly
calculate the criminal act and yet it is the act of a madman. 43 The
new rule is broad enough to include an illness of this type as a
defense.
In all future cases in the District of Columbia and New Hamp-
shire, the jury, with the aid of expert testimony, will decide the
question of irresponsibility unhampered by the narrow limitations
of the right-wrong test and the irresistible impulse test. It has al-
ways been the province of the jury to make this determination but,
it has been argued that the law must set the limits within which the
jury will be allowed to perform this function. Thus, Professor
39. See Ploscowe, Suggested Changes in the New York Laws and Procedures Re-
lating to the Criminally Insane and Mentally Defective Offenders, 43 J. Crim. L. & Crim-
inology 312, 314 (1952), Stevenson, Insanity as a Criminal Defense: The Psychiatric
Viewpoint, 25 Can. B. Rev. 731, 733 (1947).
40. See Time, LXV (Feb. 14, 1955), 62 for the psychological theory of a contempo-
rary school. Time, LXV (Mar. 7, 1955), 63 for a discussion of the startling progress be-
ing made in treating manic-depressives and schizophrenics. Francis Bello, New Light on
the Brain, Fortune, (Jan. 1955), 104 et seq. contains a revealing discussion of the prog-
ress being made in understanding how man's mind functions.
41. Stevenson, op. cit. supra note 39, at 731; Weihofen, supra note 38 at 85.
42. MacNiven. Psychoses and Criminal Responsibilty in two English Studies in Crimi-
nal Science 52 (1944).
43. See Durham v. United States, supra note 33 citing the Royal Commission on
Capital Punishment Report 110 (1949-1953).
NOTES
Wharton pointedly criticized the New Hampshire practice of allow-
ing the jury complete freedom in the matter for three reasons 4
(1) The jury does not form a continuous body prepared for its
task by prior study; (2) reasons for its decisions are not given and
so do not control future decisions, and (3) there is no supreme
jury to correct and systematize the decisions. The second and third
objections could be considered advantages of the new rule. Mental
disease may be classified for purpose of analysis and study but
mental disease takes infinite forms and therefore should not be
stereotyped. As for the first objection, it was pointed out in the
Durham caso that the jury is as capable of determining whether
a mental disease exists as it is to determine a claim under a total
disability clause of an insurance policy when the medical testimony
is obscure or in conflict.
45
CONCLUSION
Western civilization recognizes that those who commit crime be-
couse of insanity should not be held responsible. The difficulty
arises in determining what mental state will render a defendant
irresponsible at law. The judicial system, charged both with the
duty of protecting society and of protecting the insane from unjust
punishment has chosen to define rather rigidly the degree of mental
derangement that is a defense for a criminal act. In so doing they
have based the test of irresponsibility on one or two aspects of
mental activity which only partially recognize modern knowledge
of mental processes. The contention is that even where the right-
wrong test has been supplemented by the irresistible impulse test,
the criteria for determining legal irresponsibility are inadequate
when analyzed in the light of modem psychiatric discoveries. "
Thus, occasionally we see individuals with major mental disorders,
such as manic-depressives and schizophrenics, being tried and con-
victed for criminal acts for which they should not be held respon-
sible. To excuse a person whose mental disorder happens to fit the
legal test while convicting an equally blameless individual whose
disorder does not fit the test is an indefensible practice. Such a
result is much less likely under the new rule, 4 for the jury will not
be limited by the old tests, even though it may consider them in
determining responsibility. There are two safeguards available to
44. 1 Wharton and Stille, Medical Jurisprudence 180 (5th ed. 1905).
45. Durham v. United States, supra note 33.
46. See notes 40 thru 43 supra and text thereto.
47. See notes 35 thru 39 supra and text thereto.
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prevent anyone acquited under the new rule from becoming a
menace to society. In the District of Columbia, it would seem that
an accused person who is acquitted by reason of insanity is pre-
sumed insane,48 and may be commited to a hospital for the insane
for an indefinite period. 9 In addition, if the new rule should prove
too broad in practice, presumably the court may define more rigidly
the type of mental disorder that is to be a defense.
The Durham rule brings the law into harmony with prevailing
medical concepts. It provides the psychiatrist with the "fuller hear-
ing by the law" which was asked for recently.5° At last they have
an opportunity to prove to the law that society may be as well, if
not better protected by the "treatment" of the mentally ill offender
as it is by punishing him. When the proof is made it is hoped that
other courts will follow the fine example set for them by the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
LESLIE A. KAST.
EVIDENCE-LEGALrIY OF WIIRETAPPING-DIULGENCE IN COURT.-
Long a storm center of legal controversy, the question of wiretap-
ping has more recently been the subject of extensive comment. A
clarification of the admissibility of evidence obtained through wire-
tapping and a workable solution to problems stemming from the
practice of wiretapping are issues of pressing importance. In
medieval times when most criminals were members of a loosely
knit mob without means of speedy communication, society held a
great advantage over them. In the twentieth century, conspiratorial
crime carried on by use of the telephone has made surveillance over
the criminal more difficult. As a counter-balancing power, the
authorities have resorted to wiretapping. This article will attempt
48. See Barry v. White, 64 F.2d 707, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1933).
49. D. C. Code §24-301 (1951) provides: ". . . if an accused person shall be ac-
quitted by the jury on the ground of insanity, the court may certify the fact to the
Federal Security Administrator, who may order such person to be confined in the bos-
pital for the insane, . . .".
50. Zilboorg, op. cit. supra note 14, at 122. The psychiatrist of today finds himself
in great need of a fuller hearing by the law. He has more to say and to reveal about
those who commit crimes than he is allowed to say and reveal. He is eager to convince
the court and the jury that mentally sick criminals deserve an opportunity to live, if
not the opportunity to get well. He wants to convince the court and the jury that our
knowledge as to who is mentally ill, and as to who knows without really knowing, and
as to who acts seemingly rationally but actually not reasonably, has grown to such an
extent during the past fifty or seventy-five years that the law must find ways and means
of admitting the ps chiatrist's views into open court."
